

South Africa, an Onslaught of Legitimacies: A Case Study on Post-Apartheid Consociational Struggle¹

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Resumen: Después de las primeras elecciones democráticas de 1994, el resurgimiento de jefaturas provinciales ha hecho difícil que el gobierno central pueda adquirir legitimidad. Por lo tanto, la inclusión consociativa no logra adquirir su posición como sistema político establecido. Las Jefaturas bloquean las esperanzas democráticas de coalición en las provincias. El gobierno del ANC ha fracasado en el propósito original al convertirse en un grupo populista en lugar de un defensor de las instituciones democráticas. Los clivajes de Sudáfrica son demasiado extremos, haciendo inalcanzable el establecimiento de un régimen político consociativo.

Palabras clave: jefatura; apartheid; asociacionismo; Congreso Nacional Africano (ANC), el pluralismo.

Summary: After the first democratic elections of 1994, the resurgence of provincial chieftaincies has made it difficult for the central government to acquire legitimacy. Hence, consociational inclusivity fails to gain strength as the prescribed political system. Chieftaincies block democratic hopes of coalition in the provinces. The ANC government has defeated its original purposes becoming a populist group instead of a proponent of democratic institutions. South Africa's cleavages are too extreme, in that, political consociations become unattainable.

Keywords: chieftaincy; apartheid; consociationalism; African National Congress (ANC); pluralism.

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“I have not yet seen South Africa sharing power in its fullest...people in the top are preaching the gospel of this power sharing yet people in the grassroots level have nothing to share with them.”

-Interview Respondent at the University of Zululand
“Power, Privilege and Poverty”

Introduction: The Onslaught of Legitimacies

South Africa is afflicted with socioeconomic disparities that divide its population along profound ethnic lines. After Namibia, South Africa is the most unequal country in the world. The statistical correlation between democracy and economic growth presents the standard basis for a solution.² Sir Arthur Lewis furthered the latter notion and argued that for such a plural and unequal society, a very “deep democracy” is needed. Democratic institutions must be at the core of culture and everyday life. Arend Lijphart later adapted such idea into consociational democratic theory. Consociationalism is defined as the political system formed by the cooperation of antagonistic social groups on the basis of shared power. His query was on how to promote democracy when differing demographics produce serious cleavages.

Lewis won a Nobel Prize for his contributions on developmental economics. He advised Ghana and Nigeria in developmental strategies, using his “dual sector model.” One sector pertains to the unskilled indigenous, and the other to modern manufacturing. The theoretical model consists of a chronological understanding that the unskilled indigenous will become the modern manufacturers, ergo, overcoming the main developmental step. Lewis’ advice to the governments of Ghana and Nigeria was for them to wed economic growth with a democratic government, as opposed to having an authoritarian leader that would force development. This alliance, he said, was especially true for a heterogeneous society. Since, Arendt Lijphart accredits Sir Arthur Lewis as the first consociational scholar.³

Lijphart argues that if society is sufficiently homogeneous and there is a good chance for the minority to become a majority in the next elections, then there should be no quarrel over whether majority rule is fair. With disregard of its heterogeneity, South Africa has increasingly become a majoritarian government under ANC

2. Heo, Uk and Alexander Tan. 2011. *Democracy and Economic Growth: A Causal Analysis*. Comparative Politics Vol. 33, No. 4. 463-473

3. Theory Talk #8: *Arend Lijphart on Sharing Power in Africa and the Future of Democracy*
Theory Talks is an initiative by Peer Schouten | 2008-2011. <http://www.theory-talks.org/2008/05/theory-talk-8.html>

rule.⁴ Lijphart suggests that a consensual government is necessary so that peaceful and true economic development may occur in South Africa. Among other crucial points in consociational theory, Lijphart suggests South Africa to adopt incongruent federalism like in India, Switzerland and Belgium. Incongruent federalism acknowledges the differences inherent in South Africa's demographics and guarantees representation and division of power in the national assemblies.

Donald Horowitz describes the circumstance in South Africa as "characterized by cognitive dissensus." The question is whether South Africa can achieve a stable society of non-racial conflict and economic equality. This paper will illustrate the cleavages that make democracy seem a distant dream in South Africa but will argue that not even consociational theory is viable for South Africa. The argument is not that consociational theory is a bad enterprise, but that consociation itself has become, thanks to colonial legacies, impossible.

Political hegemony is the current problem of the African National Congress. In their 13-year reign, the ANC has become a populist party. That is the ideological corruption of democracy. The conflict they increasingly deal with is of a clash of ideologies that have a profound historical momentum. Horowitz agrees that South Africa's "real load of conflict, already burdened by the huge disparities in power and prosperity, is enormously increased by the fundamental ideological cleavages."⁵ The setting of the conflict is in the provincial and urban regions. White monopoly on business and the one party system's political hegemony complicates progress in the latter. In the former, South Africa has a non-structure of "multiple legitimacies," "where a new generation of traditional leaders" have emerged with legitimate undemocratic values.⁶ And where these traditional leaders dwell is referred to as the chieftaincies.

The "Republic of South Africa" must, at first glance, be understood as a convoluted amalgamation of enclaves coercively structured as one "nation." The ANC's goal has been to create a mixed polity where the chieftaincies and the democratic institutions exist together.⁷ But the corrupt government troubles this alliance and the cleavages take a hold of substantially large groups of people. The constitutions of 1993 and 1996's aim was to construct a democracy at all costs, preferably a consociational one, where minorities are given power over their fates. But the onslaught of legitimacies has open terrain to chaos at the political arena. This work will follow these inquietudes into the "controversy over whether democracy is possible in such a future society."⁸

4. Vincent, Louise. 2011. *Seducing the people: Populism and the challenge to democracy in South Africa*. Journal of Contemporary African Studies. 29:1, 1-14

5. Horowitz, Donald L. 1991. *A Democratic South Africa?* Oxford: California Press. (1)

6. Williams, J. Michael. 2010. *Chieftaincy, the State, and Democracy: Political Legitimacy in Post-Apartheid South Africa*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. (232)

7. *Ibid.* (80)

8. Horowitz, Donald L. 1991. *A Democratic South Africa?* Oxford: California Press. (1,2)

Historical Background and Idiosyncrasies: The Dutch and English Colonial Legacies

Western trading started a new era of globalization. In 1652, the Dutch East India Company, once the world's richest private company, stumbled over the South African Cape. Thereafter established an outpost that served as a strategic geographical point for trading. The arrival of the Dutch to the Cape of Good Hope meant relatively little political intervention for the native groups. But as soon as they discovered gold and diamonds, a new wave of settlers migrated to South Africa. South Africa's mineral wealth attracted Europeans of almost every nationality and religious groups: Flemish Calvinists, French, Dutch, and Germans are examples of the most significant migrations. This group of diversely different peoples was known as the Boers, which in Dutch or Afrikaaner means farmer. As they moved east, they encountered groups of locals like the Xhosa and the Zulu. War for land started the story of ethnic conflict in South Africa. After western technology won over the locals, it was only necessary to project power onto the indigenous groups to pursue their economic endeavor. The Boers started the structure of segregation of the indigenous people.

A more organized and significant colonization started with the arrival of the English in the Cape on 1795. The conflict bifurcated for the English and for the Boers. The Boers disliked British rule, giving birth to the Boer Wars. By 1910, eight years after the end of the second Boer War, the British Empire had won and established the Union of South Africa.

In 1913, the Native's Land Act gave 7% of the land to blacks. The black-natives had no right to buy land. White domination was firmly established and in "1948 it reached its zenith with the introduction of the system of racial segregation called apartheid."⁹ Apartheid was at the core of the National Party's philosophy. It meant to give exclusive dominion and legitimacy to Europeans as superior, more advanced race. This idea consisted in that whites had a history of thousands of years that lead them to modernize. Whites merited themselves the right to be superior to the black Africans, who still needed to experience such improvement. Apartheid was "in practice, an ideology of violence in that it projects the full use of the coercive powers of the state to preserve racial domination."¹⁰

9. Ranuga, Thomas K. 2000. *South Africa Under Majority Rule: A Study in Power Sharing, Racial Equality and Democracy*. Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press. (1)

10. Gerhart, Gail M. 1978. *Black power in South Africa: the evolution of an ideology*. UCP (14)

The South African Multi-ethnic Society

Post-colonial South Africa is a complicated pool of ethnicities that in a political context must be properly defined. For example the “Coloured” classification refers primordially to the descendants of “European, Khoi, San, other Africans, and ‘Malays’ brought by the Dutch from Indonesia.”¹¹ The Coloureds appear in most case studies and books as blacks. Coloureds are in their majority scattered in Western South Africa. As opposed to black Africans, the Coloureds intermix with western ideological currents and thus are more involved with democratic institutions or at least with some government decisions.

Afrikaners are the South African version of the Creole in Latin America, namely those born in the Cape of Good Hope Colony as opposed to “the Europeans who administered the Dutch East Indian Company.”¹² When the English settled in Cape Town the Afrikaners became known as the Boers (farmers). Later in the 20th century, the Boers were re-categorized as whites by the English themselves. This inclusion is directly linked to the introduction of apartheid as a way to legitimize the white race. They speak a derivation of Dutch, but native to South Africa, called Afrikaans. But this section of the whites is not at the high-end class, but belong to the middle-income social class. Afrikaners are mostly the working classes who followed orders from British government to enforce apartheid.

Another example is the term Bantu, which was an offensive way to refer to the blacks or native African. The Bantu were segregated into parochial localities. They were grouped outside all “white areas.” If they had jobs in these areas, they were treated as migrant workers with virtually no rights, and wages six times lower than the poorest Afrikaners. The blacks are almost all in Eastern South Africa and many constitute the indigenous that during the colonial and apartheid eras developed chiefdoms.

Today, chiefdoms are supposedly given cultural autonomy by the government. 14 million people, that is, 30% of South Africa’s population, belong to chieftaincies. Here, moral order mirrors their pre-colonial cultures, and its traditional pride confronts the democratic institutions of the republic. In the chiefdoms of Mvuzane, Kholweni, and Ximba, in Zululand, to mention politics causes disturbance on people. In Zulu, politics is simply *ipolitics*, because an *i* is introduced in front of a word that does not exist in the language. During the 1980s and 90s a 15 year war between the Zulu Kingdom and the military forces of the African National Congress took 20 thousand deaths which established fear for the word. For the Zulu, politics means quarrel between parties for pow-

11. Horowitz, Donald L. 1991. *A Democratic South Africa?* Oxford: California Press. (24)

12. *Ibid.* p. (24)

er. In Zululand and other kingdoms or chieftaincies, certain western terms have acquired different definitions and therefore, reactions like the above example.

Still, after apartheid ended, the whites have most if not all the economic and political power. For the students that helped with the movement of 1994, consociationalism was voted as the best alternative to further black economic prosperity. Consociationalism in the new South Africa meant that the majority party, the African National Congress, would share political power in a government of national unity with parties that had won at least five percent of the national vote.¹³ The constitutional engineering of 1993 and 1996 was outstanding in its radical reforms made to further Lijphart's notions of power sharing. But for a vast multi-societal region that had "matured" to the extent where we must call it the Republic of South Africa, for democratic goals, and for economic integration, this constitution can hardly assess the real ethnic sentiments and understanding of the past.

Western Ideological Cleavages and the Black Consciousness Movement

Since 1948, apartheid became the philosophy of the National party. A structure of laws and regulations was designed "by white employers and white workers, who shared an interest in the tight control of black labor," to guarantee the superior economic status of whites and "to perpetuate a master-servant relationship between the races in all spheres."¹⁴ But apartheid wasn't always referred to as the master-servant relationship, later it gave a new excuse.

The propaganda was of "separate development." The ideologues of the National Party arrived at the accord that the impoverished and fragmented South Africans were merely separate tribal nations. They proclaimed that 87% of the population was actually white. It was the hope of the apartheid strategists that these states would foster the growth of parochial nationalist sentiments, which would work against any wider black unity.¹⁵ This gerrymandering allowed whites to easily exploit blacks as cheap migratory labor. Development within "white areas" was meant to have a paradigm of its own. They would follow western patterns of modernization. The peripheries, where blacks live, were kept under control through legitimate black chieftaincies. Whites maintained power and privilege over blacks in this constant updating of policy making.

13. Ranuga, Thomas K. 2000. *South Africa Under Majority Rule: A Study in Power Sharing, Racial Equality and Democracy*. Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press. (4)

14. Gerhart, Gail M. 1978. *Black power in South Africa: the evolution of an ideology*. UCP (4)

15. *Ibid.* p. (11)

Similar to apartheid in its concerns for the preservation of white supremacy, trusteeship holds that the proper relationship between white and black is analogous to that of guardian and ward. Through this, whites can combine “a conscience salving benevolence with a practical policy aimed at indefinite maintenance of white privileges.”¹⁶ But the National Party’s impenitence grew substantially and the gap between apartheid and trusteeship narrowed on the political spectrum, until becoming indistinguishable. Apartheid was formalized in 1948.

Not all whites were segregationists, in 1953 the Liberal Party was created calling for the complete integration of blacks into white society. Unlike apartheid, which “calls for blacks to develop along their own lines” and pursue their own separate variants of culture, liberalism has always recognized one common human standard of measurement: the adoptions of “civilized” or modern, western ways.”¹⁷ They attacked the system’s racial inequalities and since 1936 liberal sentiments wanted the gradual democratization of the government. They were accused by the National Party of communist propaganda and in 1968 ended their formal operations.

The Liberal Party was very biased as well and did not receive much support from the blacks. Their credo professed “an equal opportunity for all men to become civilized.” Black intellectuals of the Black Consciousness Movement saw this type of passion as the ethos of the European father-like figure. The Black Consciousness Movement of the 60s opposed to the condescending white liberal opinion and advanced notions of traditional African culture.

Looking at South Africa through a Marxist lens, the radicals stand against not only racial inequality but also to the entire capitalist system in South Africa. The radicals had increasing links with the black majority. “Moral cynicism has pervaded their analysis of society, and they have scorned the liberal’s optimistic faith in the triumph of generous impulses over the forces of economic determinism.”¹⁸ This movement’s popularity was never full-fledged because of two main reasons. The National Government had organized persecutions of the members of the Communist party and because influential groups such as teachers, missionaries, liberals and politicians were explicitly anti-communist. Later generations of black students chastised white-Marxists because they saw them as the condescending paternalistic figure in a new guise.

The African National Congress was formed in 1912 as a multi-ethnic group with the aim of representing the interests of Africans as a whole. They sought to win rights for the Africans within the white states, but although prom-

16. *Ibid.* p. (6)

17. *Ibid.* p. (7)

18. *Ibid.* p. (9)

ises where made, nothing materialized. Two strands of this original union grew into different paths. One strand had a non-racial all-inclusive democratic goal, while the other manifested as orthodox African nationalism characterized by the exclusion of the whites in the political system. The latter movement sought to remove the existent polity and allow for a majority rule or governance of solely indigenous Africans.

The extreme case of the Black Consciousness Movement and of the orthodox African nationalism was the Fanonesque apocalypse. Like in Algeria against the French, consisted in a complete opposition of the colonialists. The colonized seek to exert total termination over the invasive peoples. "The masses, according to Fanon, have an intuition that their liberation can only be achieved by violence, for violence is the only thing capable of breaking the colonizers' power."¹⁹ According to Gerhart, sentiments like the Fanonesque apocalypse run strong in "under-currents" of African political thought. One example and expression of this disposition was the short-lived terrorist movement of the early 1960s known as Poqo. It is though, important to recognize this extreme, because it is apparent in similar forms in both sides of the confrontation with apartheid in one side and Fanonesque apocalypse in the other. African leaders, such as populist Thabo and Zuma, show variants of this attitude in their rhetoric to persuade advancement in political power. White leaders have bought helicopters, tanks and much fire-power to prevent any casualties that blacks may originate.

For the black working class, the explicit root of the problem of inequality was race and not class. Apartheid disguised the notion of class disparities by legitimizing their "separate development," and nationalistic sentiments within parochial territories. In time, moral international pressure gave way to stronger more autonomous ideological movements like a Black Consciousness Movement. Globalization itself, the force that originated the cleavages has also enlightened students in South Africa about anti-western ideas.

South African universities, as institutions of higher learning and centers of new ideas, became "naturally involved in the debate for and against the apartheid system."²⁰ In general, the Afrikaans-medium universities were "ideologically conservative and politically aligned with and in support of the apartheid system." The English-speaking universities were "steeped in the tradition of liberalism and were opposed to the apartheid system." The South African Student Organization (SASO) was influenced by the "militant philosophy of Black Consciousness which was committed to the psychological and physical libera-

19. *Ibid.* p. (14)

20. Ranuga, Thomas K. 2000. *South Africa Under Majority Rule: A Study in Power Sharing, Racial Equality and Democracy*. Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press. (2)

tion of black people from white domination.”²¹ An extension of this idea gave birth to the tolerance for traditional groups. In the current postmodern world, Chieftaincies have a realistic chance to exist. The problem arises when democracies seeks to include them. The complexity of the consociation requires a true adoption of democratic institutions.

Provincial Cleavages: Chieftaincies

The first democratic elections of 1994 paved the way for chieftaincies to formally be represented in the national assembly. Since, “the chieftaincy has been forced to share its authority with a new set of institutions, which are based on a set of forms, rules, and processes”²² that do not converge with its traditional legitimacy. The interim constitution of 1993 and the constitution of 1996 gave recognition and protection of the chieftaincies as patrimony of South African traditional past. Kings, chiefs and millions of Africans belonging to chieftaincies thought of this notion of traditionalism as insulting. The chieftaincies grew in number and power in correlation to the ANC government. The clash of legitimacies evolved from a state of informal to formal reality. The state needed to have accountability of these chieftaincies in order to integrate them into the national government. But the realities are radically different, and thus “struggle between chieftaincy and the state over which moral-order worldview would achieve hegemony at the local level,” would have to be contested.²³

According to the most recent government survey, there are more than “2,400 individual kings, queens, chiefs, and headmen in South Africa, who reside in seven of the nine provinces.”²⁴ Moreover, “14 million people (30 percent of the total population) live under the jurisdiction of the chieftaincy” and this does not include those who work in the “white areas” and come back everyday to their rural or semi-urban homes where chieftaincy reigns with legitimacy.

There is quite some debate as of how has chieftaincy legitimacy proven resilient over the time. Three main logical responses abound. Firstly, during the

21. Ranuga, Thomas K. 2000. *South Africa Under Majority Rule: A Study in Power Sharing, Racial Equality and Democracy*. Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press. (3)

22. Williams, J. Michael. 2010. *Chieftaincy, the State, and Democracy: Political Legitimacy in Post-Apartheid South Africa*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. (3)

23. *Ibid.* p. (3)

24. *Ibid.* According to the Draft White Paper on Traditional Leadership and Government, there are 12 kings and queens, 744 chiefs, and 1640 headmen in South Africa (2002: 39). Of the six provinces that have traditional leaders, KwaZulu-Natal has 280 chiefs, Limpopo has 188 chiefs, the Eastern Cape has 173 chiefs, with the remainder found in Mpumalanga, the Free State, and the North West. The accuracy of these numbers is open to some debate, as it has proved difficult for the government to keep track of these leaders.

long period of colonialism and apartheid, these kings, queens and chiefs rooted their influence with the immediate necessity of rural dwellers. Secondly, “there is a belief in many communities that the chief is the most important link to the ancestors and that the chief provides unity to his area through his connection with the supernatural world.”²⁵ Lastly, if there is a question of trust, these people would rely on their nearest source of ailment, namely, the chief.

For the Africans, like the Zulu or the Xhosa, education and access to knowledge during the apartheid era, was virtually impossible. Their idea of a republic, or a democracy, needless to say of liberalism, Marxism and the like, was, if existent, very different because of historical contexts. If presented, a case of trust, South Africans have and will defend their societal imperatives over any propositions of an inclusive democracy. They would draw their loyalties from colonial legacies. Chief “Gatsha Buthelezi, have been one of the most vocal and forceful advocates of the chieftaincy, and he have sought to preserve the chieftaincy’s power and autonomy in South Africa’s new political order.”²⁶ Zulu King Goodwill stated:

“We cannot afford to dispose of our traditional government institutions in favor of Western kind of democracy. That would mean we fought in vain against domination by foreigners.”²⁷

King Goodwill Zwelethini, “is the leader for 280 Zulu chiefs.”²⁸ He came to power in 1971 and lives in the province of KwaZulu. Some of these 280 chiefs were part of the Zulu Kingdom that was completely independent until 1879 when the British conquered their homeland for natural resources. One chief from another enclave said about the South African government, that it is immoral for people to be made choose between traditional leaders and “service delivery.” Service delivery refers to the structure of a representational democracy, that works in your behave from a distant place. A country so big, that the level of detachment from local culture only ends up destroying such local culture.

Chief Holomisa argues that the retention of power is not meant to be for its own sake. The retention of power seeks to protect “*the African value systems which is the bedrock of society.*”²⁹ There is consensus that people still rely heav-

25. *Ibid.* p. (8) (Weir 2005; Flint 2001; Berglund 1989; Krige 1936)

26. *Ibid.* p. (9)

27. *Ibid.* p. (253) (King Goodwill Zwelethini, *Sapa*, October 21, 2000)

28. *Ibid.* p. (6)

29. Williams, J. Michael. 2010. *Chieftaincy, the State, and Democracy: Political Legitimacy in Post-Apartheid South Africa*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

(epigraph from chief Holomisa, *Mail and Guardian*, February 16, 2000)

ily on their chiefs for their daily needs.³⁰ The bulk of 14 million South Africans is a heavy set of minorities that do not want to be included in “politics.”

There is a miniscule possibility for over time overlapping of moral orders between chieftaincies and the state. The reality is that each has historical distinct legitimacies and are fundamentally different. Thus, for better or for worse, the chieftaincy is definitely formally entrenched in post-apartheid South Africa, and it has influence over a range of decisions that affect a large segment of the population.³¹

The African National Congress and the Failure of Consociationalism

It has been pointed out very eloquently by supporters of a representative one-party system, most notably Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, that “a one-party political system is more suitable for the African countries where ethnicity has a negative impact on the political process because people there tend to vote along ethnic lines.” Like in the case of the Institutional Revolutionary Party in Mexico, Nyerere argues that in order to effectively organize and further political efficiency, the ANC should be in charge but should held different candidates within the single party. If these historically hostile and antagonistic groups have to find common ground, away from racial divisions and ethnic polarization, “it would make perfect sense that they would prefer a one-party political system where the focus would be on the merits of individual candidates rather than party platforms which are bound to perceive through racial and/or ethnic prisms.”³²

South Africa’s case presents a rather different case of this idealized single party system. It has created a political hegemony. The hegemony has outstanding corruption as it has completely moved away from the few consociational aspects written in the constitution. The dramatic drop in black support for the ANC may be an indication that “*initial high expectations of blacks for an improved life after the elections were dampened by the harsh socioeconomic conditions still surrounding them.*”³³

The African National Congress, the majority party since 1994, “*has continually made solemn promises to ‘democratize’ and ‘transform’ the lives of*

30. Williams, J. Michael. 2010. *Chieftaincy, the State, and Democracy: Political Legitimacy in Post-Apartheid South Africa*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

(Logan 2009; Beall 2006; Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Oomen 2005 and 2000).

31. Williams, J. Michael. 2010. *Chieftaincy, the State, and Democracy: Political Legitimacy in Post-Apartheid South Africa*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. (10)

32. Ranuga, Thomas K. 2000. *South Africa Under Majority Rule: A Study in Power Sharing, Racial Equality and Democracy*. Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press. (51)

33. Ibid. p. (36)

ordinary citizens.”³⁴ With a gini coefficient of 0.67 (second highest), the ANC has not kept their promise to normalize inequalities. These disparities between rich and poor, primarily between whites and blacks, illustrate that, “*even though the concept of equality under the law has become a political reality, economic justice is still a distant dream in South Africa.*”³⁵ On the political realm, South Africa is an established democracy, for sure, but the ruling “*African National Congress controls over not only the opposition but its own parliamentary back-benchers, provincial legislators, and municipal officials.*”³⁶ At the center of this authoritative political web is President Jacob Zuma. The president “*wields very tight control over all party and government subordinates, and most policy decisions.*”³⁷

The government is composed of a two chambers or a bicameral structure. The upper house is the National Council of Provinces and the lower house is the National Assembly. Incongruent federalism is supposed to be manifested through the autonomy given to the National Council of Provinces so that distinct territories have power over their respective ethnic groups. But the ANC has moved away from most democratic institutions into a stage of growing populism. There can be little doubt that “the ANC has emerged from the 2004 election as, in the immediate future, more rather than less dominant.” It has claimed a higher proportion of electoral support than ever before. The gravity of the problem is that the “ANC now has two-thirds of national majority,” which would enable it to change the constitution. Its constitutional ideals of consociationalism have de-materialized and will continue to do so. The ANC is now in charge of the parliament and all nine provinces. Furthermore, the ANC “would seem to have made major inroads into support amongst Coloureds and Indians,”³⁸ but with the “demise” of the New National Party and the Inkatha Freedom Party, the ANC has seen to merge with them. The mergers would certainly just augment the ANC’s authoritative game.

The democratic ideal is that it must be reasonably responsive to the citizens’ wishes over a long period of time.³⁹ But the levels of corruption and

34. Williams, J. Michael. 2010. *Chieftaincy, the State, and Democracy: Political Legitimacy in Post-Apartheid South Africa*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. (1)

35. Ranuga, Thomas K. 2000. *South Africa Under Majority Rule: A Study in Power Sharing, Racial Equality and Democracy*. Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press. (41)

36. Ibid. p. 14

37. Rotberg, Robert I. *Africa’s Successes: Evaluating Accomplishment*. Belfer-WPF Report 43, Program on Intrastate Conflict (Cambridge, MA, 2007) (14)

38. Daniel, John and Roger Southall. 2005. *State of the Nation: South Africa 2004-2005*. Cape Town: Human Sciences Research Council. (1)

39. Lijphart, Arend. 1984. *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries*. New Haven: Yale University Press (38)

the increasingly populist character of the ANC halt the progress. Health care programs, for example, illustrate the ANC's disability when addressing major problems. 31% of pregnant women are infected with HIV. Welfare and equal distribution of resources brings shame to the nation. While in average whites live until their 71 years of age, blacks have a 48-year life expectancy in South Africa. While the "ANC promotes the vision of a pluralist and diverse South Africa," many people in rural areas "*perceive the chieftaincy as representative of the unity of the local community, and in many cases 'strangers' are met with distrust.*"⁴⁰ The ANC mirrors the National Party in the 60's, when through gerrymandering, managed to successfully control a monopoly on South African Politics.

Conclusion

Sub-Saharan Africa is inserted into globalization in a particularly dramatic way, where the 'consensus democracy' (power-sharing) model does not seem to be implementable easily, because the state is not properly instituted in civil society, thus giving rise to ethnically motivated tensions. The inability of the ANC to create an environment that would promote democratic institutions has also planted the seed for great anti-western sentiments. The two main examples are with the chieftaincies and with the Black Consciousness Movement.

André du P. Louw sees black-white differences in terms of contrasting 'mythological' and 'rational' approaches, and Ngubane refers to 'a conflict of minds' and 'a conflict between two moralities,' one individually and one group oriented. Lijphart compares in a similar manner, but does it with differentials between Catholics and Protestants. Not even if he refers to the case where Protestants care for individual betterment versus the Catholic for corporatism, can Lijphart make such comparisons.⁴¹ As detailed above, the outcomes of South African history, show how extremely different are the ethnic polarities. Lijphart does mention briefly: "*it is reasonable to assume that the difficulties for consociational government increase as the differences among the segments increase.*"⁴²

But Catholics and Protestants share a common ancestor and have lived among each other for many years. By no means can these two "opposites" be compared to Zulu or Xhosa philosophies and assign similar degrees of their

40. Williams, J. Michael. 2010. *Chieftaincy, the State, and Democracy: Political Legitimacy in Post-Apartheid South Africa*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. (3)

41. Lijphart, Arend. 1985. *Power-Sharing in South Africa*. Policy Papers in International Affairs. Institute of International Studies, University of California Berkeley. Vol 24 (22)

42. Ibid. p. (128)

different natures. A.P. Mda, president of the African National Youth League wrote a piece in 1944 on the Bantu world. He states, “it is wrong, to measure human progress by adopting the comparative method.” He goes on to say that a ‘standard civilization’ has been attained today is an evident fact. The question, therefore, is not whether the Bantu should develop a new civilization.⁴³ The question is whether or not the Bantu are capable of assimilating Western Civilization upon the background of their historic past. A.P. Mda wanted to convey the postmodern notion that Africans had the right not to follow the modernization of the Europeans.

Lijphart writes that “most of the critiques of consociational theory can be shown to be based on faulty arguments or interpretations, and non of them can do any damage to consociationalism as a normative model.”⁴⁴ That theory of his holds that fundamentally divided societies can actually be governed democratically, if there is a sort of overarching, cooperating elite.⁴⁵ There is no such a case in South Africa. White monopolies are in every sector of the economy, and they have, for many years, successfully control the blacks through law.

South Africa is a very big piece of land, and as the unit becomes larger, representation becomes necessary and increasingly indirect. That raises the question of what kind of representation works the best. Lijphart uttered in one interview that “*representation is quite paradoxical in one sense: it is necessary for democracy, but the more indirect it is, the less democratic you could label a system. The new South Africa, despite the new legal order, is still an ethnically and racially divided and stratified society and may remain as such for years to come.*”⁴⁶

Horowitz also stated, that one person, one vote, one value and one state will degenerate into only one legal party and one last election.⁴⁷ Which is effectively what happened in South Africa. Lembede’s Youth League also expressed discontent for European condescending liberals: “*For whereas Europeans took an individualistic view of life, seeking selfishly after power, success and fame-thereby continually plunging themselves into conflict, the Africans regarded the*

43. Williams, J. Michael. 2010. *Chieftaincy, the State, and Democracy: Political Legitimacy in Post-Apartheid South Africa*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. *The Bantu World*, 12 August, 1944.

44. Lijphart, Arend. 1985. *Power-Sharing in South Africa*. Policy Papers in International Affairs. Institute of International Studies, University of California Berkeley. Vol 24 (83)

45. Theory Talk #8: *Arend Lijphart on Sharing Power in Africa and the Future of Democracy* Theory Talks is an initiative by Peer Schouten | 2008-2011. <http://www.theory-talks.org/2008/05/theory-talk-8.html>

46. Ranuga, Thomas K. 2000. *South Africa Under Majority Rule: A Study in Power Sharing, Racial Equality and Democracy*. Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press. (46)

47. Horowitz, Donald L. 1991. *A Democratic South Africa?* Oxford: California Press.

universe as one composite whole, realizing their fullest life in the corporate life.”⁴⁸ Kings, queens and chiefs along provincialities express this sentiment similarly: communal contentment is the absolute measure of African values.

The antagonistic nature of the chieftaincies in South Africa continues to block the possibility for coalitions. While, chieftaincies have essentially different structures of moral order, blacks and whites dwell between modern and postmodern ideologies of development. Low efficacy of government welfare, which has been around for 13 years and a decreasing electoral support for a new “democratic” government, continue to deteriorate a legitimate government. The African National Congress’ populist agendas under presidents Thabo and Zuma trouble the success of democratic institutions. The province holds onto chiefdoms, which creates separate legitimacies. The fact is that democracy per se, has no history in South Africa. Nelson Mandela’s administration was perhaps the closest moment to any creation of democratic institutions. But the onslaught of legitimacies can eventually cause violent consequences as the ANC overruns every cabinet and councils, thus, no consociation may be reached.

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48. *Congress Youth League Manifesto*, in *Karis and Carter*, vol. 2.

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